Unlucky Strike: Big Tobacco\u27s First Amendment Challenge to the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act by Dowgin, Laura B.
DOWGIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011 7:36 PM 
 
410 
UNLUCKY STRIKE: BIG TOBACCO’S FIRST 
AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO THE FAMILY 
SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO 
CONTROL ACT 
Laura B. Dowgin* 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 411 
I. BACKGROUND .............................................................................. 412 
a. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp ........................ 412 
b. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act ........ 413 
c. Pre-Existing Tobacco Regulation .......................................... 415 
II. LORILLARD TOBACCO CO. V. REILLY: A SUCCESSFUL 
CHALLENGE TO TOBACCO REGULATIONS.................... 417 
III. IS CENTRAL HUDSON STILL THE APPROPRIATE TEST? .. 422 
a. 1986: Deference to the Government ...................................... 423 
b. 1990s: Trend Toward Stricter Application of Central 
Hudson ............................................................................... 425 
i. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island ....................................... 425 
ii. Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United 
States ............................................................................. 428 
c. Recent Decisions: Continuing Trend Toward Strict 
Scrutiny .............................................................................. 429 
d. Future Predictions for Central Hudson Analysis ................... 431 
IV. BIG TOBACCO’S CURRENT CHALLENGE TO THE 
FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO 
CONTROL ACT ....................................................................... 432 
a. Ban on Color and Graphics ................................................... 433 
b. Ban on Statements Regarding FDA Approval ...................... 434 
V. UNDER CENTRAL HUDSON, SEVERAL ACT 
PROVISIONS SHOULD BE HELD 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL .......................................................... 435 
a. Ban on Outdoor Advertising.................................................. 437 
b. Ban on Brand Name Sponsorship ......................................... 438 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in History, Colgate 
University, 2006 (go ‘gate!). I would like to thank my parents, Cathy and Michael Dowgin, 
for their guidance, support, and love, as well as Josh for helping greatly with the 
development of this Note. Additional thanks to Professor Ronald Riccio for his invaluable 
advice and input. 
DOWGIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:36 PM 
2011 TOBACCO FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE 411 
c. Bans on Product Samples and Gifts ...................................... 439 
VI. SOLUTION: REDUCING THE SCOPE OF THE ACT. ............. 441 
CONCLUSION.................................................................................... 442 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Joe Camel, the hip smoking camel of the 1980s and 1990s was 
created in 1974 by the British artist Nicholas Price.1 In 1988, Joe Camel 
arrived in the United States to celebrate the seventy-fifth anniversary of 
R.J. Reynolds’ Camel brand cigarettes.2 By 1991, children aged five and 
six could identify Joe Camel almost as frequently as they could identify 
Mickey Mouse.3 Due to outrage from public interest groups and 
pressure from an impending lawsuit challenging the targeting of minors 
in cigarette advertising, R.J. Reynolds voluntarily ended its Joe Camel 
campaign in 1997.4 
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the recently passed Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (hereinafter “the Act”) as 
it relates to the First Amendment rights of tobacco manufacturers and 
retailers. The Act was passed in order to curb the use of tobacco 
products by children and, therefore, gives the Food and Drug 
Administration (hereinafter “FDA”) broad power to regulate tobacco 
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers in order to prevent children 
from becoming addicted to tobacco products.5 On August 31, 2009, 
several tobacco companies filed suit against the FDA alleging First 
Amendment speech violations and seeking an injunction preventing the 
agency from enforcing several marketing and advertising restrictions.6 
 
1 Stuart Elliott, The Media Business: Advertising; Camel’s Success and Controversy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/12/business/the-media-
business-advertising-camel-s-success-and-controversy.html.  
2 Id.  
3 Paul M. Fischer et al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years: Mickey 
Mouse and Old Joe the Camel, 266 JAMA 3145, 3147 (1991). 
4 Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 74 (Cal. 1994) (holding that the 
state is not preempted by federal law from shielding minors from cigarette advertising); 
William Booth, California Sends Joe Camel to an Early Retirement, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 
1997, at A10; Yumiko Ono & Bruce Ingersoll, RJR Retires Joe Camel, Adds Sexy Smokers, 
WALL ST. J., July 11, 1997, at B1. 
5 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, §§ 2, 3, 
123 Stat. 1776, 1779, 1781-82 (2009). 
6 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Commonwealth Brands, 
Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d. 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. 1:09CV-117-M) 
[hereinafter “Plaintiff’s Complaint”]; see Editorial, Big Tobacco Strikes Back, N.Y. TIMES, 
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Part I of this Note will describe the background surrounding the 
development of the Act along with a brief history of tobacco regulation 
in the United States. Part II will examine the 2001 Lorillard decision, in 
which a tobacco company successfully challenged regulations that are 
strikingly similar to the regulations promulgated by the Act.7 Part III 
will discuss the appropriate constitutional framework for analyzing 
restrictions on commercial speech. Part IV will address the current 
challenge to the Act, and Part V will demonstrate how several of the 
Act’s provisions should be held unconstitutional because they 
impermissibly restrict commercial speech. 
I. BACKGROUND 
a. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp 
In 1996, the FDA issued “Regulations Restricting the Sale and 
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children 
and Adolescents.”8 Although the agency had never before regulated 
tobacco products,9 it asserted jurisdiction over nicotine as a drug based 
on the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (hereinafter “FDCA”), which 
grants the FDA the authority to regulate drugs and drug delivery 
devices.10 The FDA then promulgated a series of restrictions restraining 
tobacco advertising and marketing in order to substantially reduce the 
availability of these products to children and adolescents.11 Restrictions 
included: a prohibition against free samples, a prohibition against self-
service displays, restriction of advertising to black-and-white text only, 
a prohibition against outdoor advertisements within 1000 feet of public 
 
Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/07/opinion/07mon1.html.  
7 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
8 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless 
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (Aug. 28, 1996). 
9 John Schwartz, Smoke, Letters and Documentation; Tobacco Companies Swamp FDA 
With Final Comments on Regulation, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1996, at A20; see also FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000) (holding that Congress had 
not granted the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products). 
10 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938); Regulations 
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect 
Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,397; Marlene Cimons, Cigarette Regulation 
Plan Challenged; Tobacco: Five Major Companies Along with Pro-Smoker, Advertising 
and Trade Groups Claim FDA Has No Jurisdiction Over Product, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1996, 
at A11. 
11 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless 
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,397-400. 
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playgrounds and schools, a prohibition against advertising in 
publications not geared toward adults, and a prohibition against tobacco 
manufacturers sponsoring athletic, musical, artistic or other social or 
cultural events.12 
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,13 the tobacco 
industry challenged these regulations on both jurisdictional and First 
Amendment grounds.14 The Supreme Court held that Congress had not 
given the FDA authority under the FDCA to regulate tobacco products.15 
The Court struck down the regulations, stating that “an administrative 
agency’s power to regulate in the public interest must always be 
grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress . . . we must take 
care not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the point where 
Congress indicated it would stop.”16 Thus, the Supreme Court did not 
reach the constitutional issue in 2000. 
b. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
President Obama signed the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act into law on June 22, 2009.17 The Act is a 
Congressional response to the Court’s holding in FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp.; the intent is to give the FDA the express 
jurisdiction it lacked in 1996.18 The Act adopts the proposed 1996 
“Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and 
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents,” along with 
some new provisions, and states that these regulations are consistent 
 
12 Id. at 44,617-18. 
13 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120. 
14 Id. at 129-30. 
15 Id. at 142. The FDCA requires that the FDA refuse to approve a drug if it is not “safe 
and effective for its intended purpose.” Id. (summarizing 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1938)). 
Therefore, if tobacco products were considered under the FDA’s jurisdiction, the FDA 
would be required to remove them from the market. Id. at 135. 
16 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 161. Because the Court determined 
that FDA regulation of tobacco products was beyond the scope of the FDCA, it did not 
reach the First Amendment challenge. Id. 
17 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 
1776 (2009); see also Press Release, Matthew Myers, President, Campaign for Tobacco-
Free Kids, RJR, Other Tobacco Companies go to Court to Evade Regulation by FDA (Sept. 
1, 2009), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idus156603+01-Sep-
2009+PRN20090901. 
18 § 3, 123 Stat. at 1781. The FDA is recognized as the “primary Federal regulatory 
authority with respect to the manufacture, marketing, and distribution of tobacco products.” 
Id. 
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with the First Amendment.19 Congress found that adopting the 
regulations will “directly and materially advance the Federal 
Government’s substantial interest in reducing the number of children 
and adolescents who use cigarettes and smokeless tobacco,”20 and that 
the regulations are “narrowly tailored to restrict those advertising and 
promotional practices which are most likely to be seen or heard by 
youth and most likely to entice them into tobacco use.”21 
The Act includes several important additions to the 1996 
Regulations. For example, by June 22, 2011, the FDA must issue 
regulations requiring graphic color warnings on tobacco product 
packages to show the harmful effects tobacco products can have on the 
body.22 The additional regulations also state that beginning September 
22, 2009, cigarettes may no longer contain artificial flavoring other than 
menthol.23 Another important component of the Act is the banning of 
any new modified risk tobacco product, as well as prohibiting the 
labeling of tobacco products as “light,” “mild,” or “low tar.”24 Despite 
the seemingly severe restrictions on the tobacco industry, it is important 
to note that Congress did not give the FDA unlimited power to regulate 
the tobacco industry.25 The FDA does not have the power to ban tobacco 
 
19 Id. § 2. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. 
22 Id. § 201. See also Joe Borlik, Disturbing Images Coming to U.S. Cigarette 
Packages, CENT. MICH. LIFE (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.cm-
life.com/2009/09/09/disturbing-images-coming-to-u-s-cigarette-packages/ (describing the 
images that potential warning labels could include, such as images of black teeth and rotting 
lungs). 
23 Id. § 101.  
24 § 101, 123 Stat. at 1812. “The term ‘modified risk tobacco product’ means any 
tobacco product that is sold or distributed for use to reduce harm or the risk of tobacco-
related disease associated with commercially marketed tobacco products.” Id. 
25 The Act is an example of Congressional delegation of legislative authority to the 
FDA. In 1935, the U.S. Supreme Court held that trade associations/agencies cannot be 
considered legislative bodies simply because they had familiarity with the problem of their 
industry. “Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly 
inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.” A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935). Although A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. has never been formally overruled, subsequent cases have held that as long as 
there are some guidelines given by Congress, delegation of legislative power is not 
unconstitutional. E.g., Whitman v. Am. Truckers Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 458 (2001) 
(finding that where Congress sets out intelligible guiding principles, there is no 
constitutional violation). Some commentators have criticized the downfall of the non-
delegation doctrine, claiming that “[d]elegation allows legislators to claim credit for benefits 
which a regulatory statute promises yet escape the blame for the burdens it will impose, 
DOWGIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:36 PM 
2011 TOBACCO FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE 415 
products entirely, nor can the FDA require the reduction of nicotine 
levels in tobacco products to zero.26 
The stated purpose of the Act is to achieve the public health goal of 
curbing tobacco use by adolescents.27 After performing extensive 
research, Congress found that the United States is currently in a public 
health crisis due to tobacco use and the fact that advertising has more of 
an influence on children than adults.28 Additionally, Congress found that 
reducing tobacco use by minors by just fifty percent would prevent over 
10,000,000 children from becoming regular smokers and would save 
$75,000,000,000 in reduced health care costs.29 The Congressional 
findings also note that tobacco manufacturers make false and 
misleading statements regarding modified risk products, and that the 
government has a compelling interest in “ensuring that statements about 
modified risk tobacco products are complete, accurate, and relate to the 
overall disease risk of the product.”30 
c. Pre-Existing Tobacco Regulation 
Even prior to 1996, federal regulations rigorously limited how and 
where tobacco products could be advertised, sold, and used. Beginning 
in 1971 with the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, it 
became illegal for cigarettes and little cigars to be advertised on “any 
medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Communications Commission.”31 This provision effectively 
banned the advertisement of tobacco products on the radio or television. 
Another federal regulation requires a conspicuous warning statement to 
be placed on all tobacco products, such as “SURGEON GENERAL’S 
WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, 
Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.”32 In 1992, the federal 
 
because they do not issue the laws needed to achieve those benefits.” DAVID SCHOENBROD, 
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH 
DELEGATION 10 (1993).  
26 §101, 123 Stat. at 1803. 
27 Id. § 2. 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 15 U.S.C.A. § 1335 (West 2011). Little cigars are smoke products that resemble 
cigarettes and are wrapped in tobacco leaves. Julia Cartwright, Little Cigar Consumption on 
the Rise, While Cigarette Use Declines, AM. LEGACY FOUND. (Feb. 4, 2009, 6:54 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idus275857+04-Feb-2009+PRN20090204. 
32 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(1) (West 2011). 
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government passed a law making a grant available to states contingent 
on the banning of the sale of tobacco products to minors.33 Other current 
federal regulations include taxes on cigarettes and a prohibition against 
smoking in or around federal buildings.34 
There are also restrictions at the state level. Just over half of all 
states have enacted some form of smoke-free law prohibiting smoking 
in public places such as workplaces, restaurants and bars.35 New Jersey 
enacted the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act in 2006, banning smoking 
in all bars and restaurants, but not on beaches or in city parks.36 New 
York passed a similar law in 2003, banning smoking in bars and 
restaurants, on public transportation, and in indoor arenas.37 Both New 
York and New Jersey allow for local municipalities to regulate smoking 
more stringently than the state law provides.38 For example, New York 
City recently passed a controversial law banning smoking in city parks 
and on public beaches.39 In September 2009, Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
publicly stated that the City intended to make it “as difficult and as 
expensive to smoke as we possibly can.”40 In May 2009, North Carolina, 
a state with a rich history of tobacco cultivation, banned smoking in all 
restaurants and bars.41 
 
33 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x-26 (West 2011). Minors in this instance are persons under the 
age of eighteen. Id. 
34 27 C.F.R. § 40.23 (2009); Protecting Federal Employees and the Public From 
Exposure to Tobacco Smoke in the Federal Workplace, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,360 (Dec. 22, 
2008). 
35 The Associated Press, Halfway There, Smoking Ban Movement Sets Sights on Rest of 
Nation, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 21, 2007, at 7B. 
36 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-58 (West 2006). 
37 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-O (McKinney 2008). 
38
“The provisions of this act shall supersede any other statute…concerning smoking in 
an indoor public place…except for those provisions of a municipal ordinance which provide 
restrictions on or prohibitions against smoking equivalent to, or greater than, those provided 
under this act.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-63. “Nothing herein shall be construed to restrict 
the power of any county, city, town, or village to adopt and enforce additional local law, 
ordinances, or regulations which comply with at least the minimum applicable standards set 
forth in this article.” N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-R (McKinney 2011). 
39 See, e.g., Editorial, Too Much of a Good Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/opinion/05sat4.html. 
40 David Seifman, Anti-smoking Mike Dubious of ‘Cig-arrests’, N.Y. POST, Sept. 16, 
2009,  http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/anti_smoking_mike_dubious_of_cig_8dqwzX 
pJdbOAX1pWxsAlCJ. 
41 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 130A-496 (West 2010); Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 
Tobacco Farming the Old Way, LEARN NC, http://www.learnnc.org/lp/editions/nchist-
newsouth/4386 (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
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In addition to government regulation of conduct and product usage, 
the tobacco industry voluntarily ceased certain advertising and 
marketing practices in a November 1998 Master Settlement Agreement 
with the Attorneys General of forty-six states.42 In exchange for the 
settlement of lawsuits against the tobacco industry, the manufacturers 
agreed to cease targeting children in the advertisement and promotion of 
tobacco products.43 Additionally, tobacco companies agreed to refrain 
from lobbying against legislation aimed at reducing youth smoking, and 
also contributed funds to set up a National Foundation to support 
programs aimed at reducing youth tobacco usage.44 
At a press conference discussing the Master Settlement Agreement, 
the Attorney General of Massachusetts, Scott Harshbarger, announced 
that he was planning to propose additional consumer protection 
regulations in the future.45 Harshbarger intended to further restrict the 
advertising and sales practices of tobacco companies in order to reduce 
“the incidence of cigarette smoking and smokeless tobacco use by 
children under legal age.”46 These additional regulations imposed on 
tobacco companies by Massachusetts were met with constitutional 
challenges in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly. 
II. LORILLARD TOBACCO CO. V. REILLY: A SUCCESSFUL 
CHALLENGE TO TOBACCO REGULATIONS 
In January 1999, just three months after the Master Settlement 
Agreement was signed, Massachusetts Attorney General Harshbarger 
 
42 Participating manufacturers included Brown & Williamson, Lorillard, Philip Morris, 
and R.J. Reynolds. See, e.g., Master Settlement Agreement, ST. OF CAL. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUST. – OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., http://www.ag.ca.gov/tobacco/pdf/1msa.pdf (last visited 
May 5, 2011) [hereinafter MSA]. Beginning in 1994, forty-six states filed suit against the 
tobacco industry attempting to recover Medicaid and other public health expenses caused by 
smoking-related illnesses. See, e.g., Robin Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, 
Application and Effect of Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) Between Tobacco Companies 
and Various  States, and State Statutes Implementing Agreement; Use and Distribution of 
MSA Proceeds, 25 A.L.R. 6th 435 (2005). On November 23, 1998, the MSA was entered 
into wherein the tobacco manufacturers agreed to limit certain marketing and advertising 
practices, as well as promote programs aimed at reducing youth smoking. Id. 
43 MSA, supra note 43, at 14. Tobacco companies would no longer use cartoons in 
advertisements, sponsor events targeted at children, distribute free samples except at adult-
only events, pay media companies to reference their products when not directed at adults, or 
give gifts in consideration of tobacco purchase without requiring proof of age. Id. 
44 Id. at 25. 
45 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 533 (2001). 
46 Id. at 533. 
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promulgated a series of regulations that were broader than the scope of 
the settlement.47 The regulations included a ban on outdoor advertising 
within 1000 feet of any public playground or school, a prohibition 
against indoor advertisements located lower than five feet from the 
ground, and restrictions on certain retail sales practices.48 The 
restrictions applied to cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars.49 
Tobacco manufacturers challenged the regulations on the basis that 
they were pre-empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act (hereinafter “FCLAA”), and were unconstitutional on 
First Amendment free speech grounds.50 The Supreme Court found that 
since the FCLAA applies exclusively to cigarettes, the FCLAA pre-
empted the state law as it applied to cigarettes only.51 Therefore, 
although the Court did not address the constitutionality of the cigarette 
provisions, it did have the opportunity to analyze the provisions relating 
to smokeless tobacco and cigars for compliance with the First 
Amendment.52 
The Court evaluated the regulations for constitutional soundness 
using the four-part test for commercial speech stated in Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York:53 
(1) The speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading; 
(2) The government interest must be substantial; 
(3) The regulation must directly advance the government interest; 
and 
 
47 Id. at 533-34. 
48 The restrictions also prohibited indoor advertising visible from the outside and 
advertising in an enclosed stadium. The regulated retail sales practices included banning 
self-service displays of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, as well as forcing retailers to place 
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco in areas that are not accessible to consumers. Many of 
these regulations are identical or similar to the provisions of the 1996 FDA regulations, and 
the current Act. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and 
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,399 (Aug. 
28, 1996); 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 21.04 (2000); e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 
534-35. 
49 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 21.02, 22.02 (2000); e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 
534-36. 
50 Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 532. 
51 Id. at 553. 
52 Id. The Court noted that the cigarette petitioners only raised pre-emption challenges 
as to the outdoor advertising and indoor advertising restrictions, but not the sales practices 
restrictions. Therefore, the Court evaluated the retail sales practices for constitutional 
soundness for cigarettes as well as cigars and smokeless tobacco. Id. 
53 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of  N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). 
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(4) The regulation can not be more extensive than necessary to 
accomplish the government interest.54 
 
The Court recognized that there had been some debate in the past 
over whether commercial speech should even be treated separately from 
regular speech, as restrictions on regular speech are subject to strict 
scrutiny.55 The tobacco companies argued for the application of strict 
scrutiny instead of the Central Hudson framework, but the Court 
ultimately found that there was no need to break new ground; Central 
Hudson provided an “adequate basis for decision.”56 The Court held that 
regulations on outdoor and indoor advertising were unconstitutional, 
while the direct regulations on sales practices were constitutional.57 
Both sides conceded the first two prongs of Central Hudson with 
regard to both the indoor and outdoor advertising: the advertising 
concerned lawful activity and was not misleading, and the government 
had a substantial interest in preventing the use of tobacco products by 
minors.58 The third prong of the Central Hudson test states that 
regulations must “directly and materially advance the government 
interest” and that “this burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or 
conjecture.”59 The State put forth the studies that the FDA had 
conducted for the proposed regulations in 1996.60 In those studies, the 
FDA found that the adolescent years are when most smokers first use 
tobacco products and that advertising plays a central role in this 
decision.61 The Court determined that the State provided “ample 
documentation of the problem with underage use of smokeless tobacco 
 
54 Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 554 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elect. Corp., 447 
U.S. at 566). 
55 Id. The Central Hudson Court developed a separate framework for analyzing 
commercial speech because of the “distinction between speech proposing a commercial 
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and 
other varieties of speech.” Id. 
56 Id. at 554-55. Justice Thomas’ concurrence in this case argues that strict scrutiny 
should apply where the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress 
ideas it conveys. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
57 Id. at 566-67, 569. 
58 Id. at 555. 
59 Id. 
60 Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 557. 
61 Id. at 557-58. The FDA studies only included cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. The 
Attorney General also produced evidence of the rising use of cigars by minors and the link 
between advertising and youth cigar use. Id. at 560. 
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and cigars” with respect to outdoor advertising.62 Given the strong 
connection between advertising and youth smoking, the Court held that 
the proposed regulations would, in fact, advance the state goal.63 
Therefore, the third prong of Central Hudson was satisfied. 
Despite satisfying the first three prongs, the Court determined that 
the outdoor regulations did not satisfy the fourth prong and were 
therefore invalid.64 The fourth step requires a reasonable fit between the 
means and the ends of the scheme.65 The Court explained that “the 
governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials . . . 
does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed 
to adults.”66 A complete ban on the communication of truthful speech 
about a lawful product to adult consumers violates the Constitution 
because the tobacco retailers have a right to convey this information and 
adult smokers have the right to hear it.67 Here, the extensive reach of the 
regulations would end up preventing advertising completely in major 
metropolitan areas of Massachusetts, as the 1000-foot radii around 
playgrounds and schools would likely overlap and cover entire cities.68 
Additionally, the 1000-foot requirement was seemingly arbitrary and 
chosen only because that was what the FDA had intended to do in 
1996.69 Moreover, the Court noted that “the impact of a restriction on 
speech will undoubtedly vary from place to place. The FDA’s 
regulations would have had widely disparate effects nationwide.”70 
The indoor advertising requirements met a similar fate. Although 
the first two prongs of the Central Hudson test were met, both the third 
and fourth prongs of the test were violated.71 The goal of preventing 
minors from having access to tobacco products was purported to be 
directly advanced by the five-foot requirement, which forced retailers to 
ensure that any indoor advertising was always higher than five feet from 
 
62 Id. at 561. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 564. See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) (“The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be 
limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox.”). 
67 Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 564. 
68 Id. at 562. 
69 Id. at 562-63. 
70 Id. at 563. 
71 Id. at 566. 
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the ground.72 This height requirement intended to keep tobacco 
advertisements out of the typical viewing range of children,73 however, 
the Court criticized this particular method because many minors are 
taller than five feet, and even if they are not, they can still see the 
advertisement when they look up.74 Therefore, the regulation did not 
directly advance any legitimate government interest. 
The indoor advertising regulations also failed the fourth prong 
because the regulation did not reasonably fit the goal of preventing 
children from using tobacco.75 The Court found other less-restrictive 
alternatives that would prevent youth-targeted tobacco advertisements, 
such as preventing floor-level, candy-like displays.76 Although the 
burden imposed on commercial speech by the indoor regulations would 
be very small, there is no “de minimis exception for a speech restriction 
that lacks sufficient tailoring or justification.”77 The restriction on height 
was an unconstitutional restriction of the tobacco companies’ First 
Amendment rights.78 
Although the restrictions on advertising were invalidated by the 
Court, the sales practices restrictions were upheld as constitutionally 
permissible direct regulation on conduct.79 There was a disagreement 
between the District Court and the Court of Appeals as to whether 
restrictions on the physical location of tobacco products implicate any 
speech interest at all.80 The Supreme Court found that the question did 
not need to be answered because even if speech interests were 
implicated by the restriction on product displays, these particular 
regulations did not violate the First Amendment.81 The first two prongs 
of Central Hudson were satisfied, as with the indoor and outdoor 
advertising restrictions.82 The regulations passed the third prong of the 
test because unattended displays of tobacco products give minors access 
 
72 Id. 
73 Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 566. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 567. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 569. 
80 Id. at 568. The District Court found that there was no speech interest involved, 
whereas the Circuit Court determined that self-service displays do have “some 
communicative commercial function.” Id. 
81 Id. at 569. 
82 Id. 
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to cigarettes, cigars, and/or smokeless tobacco without having to show 
proof of age.83 Prohibiting self-service displays is a successful way to 
ensure that children will not have direct access to handling tobacco 
products. Finally, the fourth prong of the test was satisfied because the 
regulations “leave open ample channels of communication [and] . . . do 
not significantly impede adult access to tobacco products.”84 Adult 
smokers are still able to ask sales personnel for the tobacco product so 
that they can inspect the product prior to purchase.85 
Lorillard sets up an important framework for any evaluation of the 
Act because it demonstrates how the Supreme Court will likely evaluate 
the First Amendment challenge by the tobacco industry. Additionally, 
since one of the challenged provisions in the Act is identical to the 
outdoor advertising restriction struck down by the Court in 2001, 
Lorillard is extremely relevant because it shows how the Supreme 
Court dealt with the exact regulation at issue.86 
III. IS CENTRAL HUDSON STILL THE APPROPRIATE TEST? 
In 1976, the Supreme Court determined that the special nature of 
commercial speech allowed states to regulate potentially deceptive 
speech more stringently than other forms of speech.87 However, it also 
recognized for the first time that commercial speech is, in fact, entitled 
to some form of First Amendment protection.88 The Court decided 
Central Hudson in 1980, promulgating a four-part test for the 
constitutionality of commercial speech, and since then several justices, 
particularly Justice Clarence Thomas, have criticized the test. In Justice 
Thomas’s opinion, as well as the opinions of several others, when the 
government is attempting to regulate to keep truthful information from 
reaching the public, there should be no difference between non-
 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 570. 
86 The Act adopts the 1996 regulations that were proposed by the FDA. Congress 
directed the FDA to modify these regulations in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-31, § 102, 123 Stat. 1776, 1831 (2009).  
87 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976) 
(“The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State from insuring 
that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.”). 
88 Id. at 763 (“[A] particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial 
information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most 
urgent political debate.”). 
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commercial and commercial speech.89 “[Where] the government’s 
asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in 
order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the Central 
Hudson test should not be applied because such an interest is per se 
illegitimate. . .”90 Those sharing Justice Thomas’ opinion argue that 
strict scrutiny, rather than Central Hudson, should apply because there 
is no “basis for asserting that ‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’ 
than non-commercial speech.”91 In response, the government argues that 
a regulation on speech that “promotes socially harmful activities” 
should be subject to a lesser standard than Central Hudson and should 
be given highly deferential treatment.92 In the past, the Court has 
uniformly rejected both arguments, refusing to “break new ground” 
where the Central Hudson test provides an adequate test upon which to 
make a decision.93 
Although Central Hudson appears to remain the appropriate test to 
determine the constitutionality of commercial speech, over the past two 
decades the test has not always been applied consistently. The Supreme 
Court has, over time, given less deference to the government and has 
come closer to a strict scrutiny test for commercial speech. It is useful to 
briefly visit several cases in order to determine how a court is likely to 
apply the Central Hudson analysis to the Act at issue. 
a. 1986: Deference to the Government 
In 1986, in Posadas v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, the Supreme 
Court upheld a Puerto Rican restriction on the advertisement of casinos, 
finding that it satisfied the Central Hudson test.94 The Games of Chance 
Act of 1948 was amended in 1972 to state that, “no gambling room 
shall be permitted to advertise or otherwise offer their facilities to the 
 
89 See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
90 Id. 
91 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring); 
Posadas v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 350 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
92 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 n.2 (1995) (finding that there should 
be no exception to the Central Hudson standard regardless of the allegedly harmful activity 
being advertised). 
93 E.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 368 (2002). 
94 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 331. 
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public of Puerto Rico.”95 A lower court narrowed the interpretation of 
the statute to mean that the only advertising that was prohibited was 
advertising aimed to attract Puerto Rican residents, not advertising 
aimed at tourists, even if it would incidentally reach residents.96 The 
Supreme Court thus based their evaluation of the regulation upon the 
narrowed construction.97 
As a threshold matter, the Court determined that the advertising 
aimed at Puerto Rican residents concerned a lawful activity and was not 
misleading, and therefore satisfied Central Hudson’s first prong.98 The 
Court found that the government satisfied prong two because it had a 
substantial interest in reducing gambling among citizens in order to 
promote the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.99 Prong three was 
fulfilled because the Court found it reasonable that a reduction in 
advertising would result in reduced demand for gambling.100 The 
Posadas Court applied a seemingly low standard for the government to 
meet here; no substantive proof was required so long as the legislature 
had a subjectively reasonable belief that the restrictions would reduce 
gambling.101 Prong four, requiring a reasonable fit between the means 
and the goal, was also satisfied due to the narrowing construction that 
the lower court had given the statute.102 In addition to stating that the 
regulations passed constitutional muster, the Court made the 
controversial statement that if the legislature has the authority to 
completely ban an activity, as they did with gambling, then included 
 
95 Id. at 332 (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 77 (1948) (amended 1972)). 
96 Id. at 334-35. This interpretation has been codified by Puerto Rico. “It shall be illegal 
for any holder of a gambling license or his/her agents or employees to advertise or offer any 
gambling room to the public in any other way, except when the publicity is directed to the 
foreign tourists and not to the residents of Puerto Rico. Provided, however, [t]hat an 
advertisement directed to the foreign tourists shall not be illegal should it incidentally reach 
the residents of Puerto Rico.” P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 77 (emphasis added). 
97 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 339. 
98 Id. at 340-41.  
99 Id. at 341. 
100 Id. at 341-42. The Court also stated that prong three was further proven by the fact 
that the appellant chose to litigate the case all the way to the Supreme Court. If advertising 
did not reduce demand, then there would be no need to challenge restrictions on it. Id. at 
342.   
101 Id. at 341-42. 
102 Id. at 343 (“The narrowing constructions of the advertising restrictions announced by 
the Superior Court ensure that the restrictions will not affect advertising of casino gambling 
aimed at tourists, but will apply only to such advertising when aimed at the residents of 
Puerto Rico.”). 
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within that power is necessarily the lesser power to restrict 
advertising.103 The Posadas Court gave the state broad power to regulate 
commercial speech even where the state did not show any substantive 
proof that the restrictions would achieve the acknowledged legitimate 
goal. Additionally, the Court would be even more deferential to the 
government where they had the power to completely ban the activity 
that was being advertised. After Posadas, so long as the subject of the 
speech was an activity that the State could directly regulate, it was not 
unconstitutional to restrict, or even prohibit advertising. 
b. 1990s: Trend Toward Stricter Application of Central Hudson 
i. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island 
In 1996, Rhode Island’s ban on advertising the price of liquor was 
struck down as an impermissible restriction on commercial speech in 44 
Liquormart v. Rhode Island.104 In only ten years, the Court made a 
dramatic shift toward viewing government restrictions on commercial 
speech with more scrutiny. In the plurality opinion, the Court stated that 
there are special concerns that arise where the government “suppres[ses] 
commercial speech in order to pursue a non-speech related policy.”105 
This decision distinguished between two types of commercial speech 
regulations: regulations that protect the public against bad sales 
practices and regulations that prevent information from reaching the 
public.106 In the first instance, the “purpose of the regulation is consistent 
with the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial 
speech and therefore justifies less than strict review.”107 However 
regarding the second type of regulation, where there is a limitation put 
on truthful speech that is not related to consumer protection, but is 
instead aimed at preventing information from reaching the public, 
“there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First 
Amendment generally demands.”108 The Court held that the second type 
of speech restriction is based on an impermissible government motive to 
 
103 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346. This was in response to appellant’s argument that if 
gambling is legal, then the government should not be allowed to restrict advertising to 
reduce demand for a legal activity. Id. 
104 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
105 Id. at 500. 
106 Id. at 501. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
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protect the public from “respond[ing] irrationally” to truthful 
information.109 The First Amendment requires that the public be able to 
assess the value of this type of information without government 
interference.110 
Before applying the Central Hudson test, the Court noted that the 
Rhode Island advertising ban fell within this second form of speech 
restriction, and that “speech prohibitions of this type rarely survive 
constitutional review.” Similarly, it is also clear that the advertising 
provisions of the Act fall within this same category of speech 
restriction. These provisions are an attempt by the federal government 
to prevent truthful information about tobacco products from reaching 
the American adult public in order to pursue a non-speech related 
policy, lowering the smoking rate in the United States. The Act does not 
focus on bad sales practices, but rather on limiting the way in which 
truthful, non-misleading information can reach the public. 
As a threshold matter in 44 Liquormart, the Court accepted that the 
restricted speech, the advertisement of liquor prices, was truthful and 
non-misleading speech about a lawful product.111 The asserted state 
interest here was temperance, a reduction in alcohol consumption.112 
There was no discussion regarding the validity of this state interest; 
rather the Court moved directly to prong three after some clarification 
of Rhode Island’s intentions.113 Therefore, in 1996, courts were mostly 
deferring to legislatures regarding the permissible objective prong. 
The Court then broke away from the deferential standard set out in 
Posadas by requiring actual proof of a direct advancement of the state 
goals in order to satisfy the third prong. “A commercial speech 
regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote 
support for the government’s purpose. . .the State bears the burden of 
showing not merely that its regulation will advance its interest, but also 
that it will do so ‘to a material degree.’”114 Here, a mere rational belief 
on the part of the legislature was not enough to pass Central Hudson’s 
 
109 Id. at 503.  
110 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 497 (“it is precisely this kind of choice, between the 
dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, 
that the First Amendment makes for us.” (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976))). 
111 Id. at 504.  
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 504 n.14. 
114 Id. at 505. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)). 
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prong three as it did in Posadas. “Such speculation certainly does not 
suffice when the State takes aim at accurate commercial information for 
paternalistic ends.”115 As Rhode Island did not introduce any actual 
evidence proving that its prohibition would significantly reduce 
alcoholism and alcohol consumption, its regulations failed the third 
prong.116 
Finally, the Court found that the regulations failed Central 
Hudson’s fourth prong because it was clear that there were other options 
available to the state that did not involve an impermissible restriction on 
speech.117 The Court listed a myriad of alternatives, from increased 
taxation to educational campaigns.118 Most notably, the Court rejected 
the Posadas reasoning that the power to ban necessarily includes the 
power to restrict speech.119 “Contrary to the assumption made in 
Posadas, we think it quite clear that banning speech may sometimes 
prove far more intrusive than banning conduct.”120 Although the speech 
related to a “vice” activity, which could be directly outlawed, the Court 
found that the restrictions on speech still needed to pass constitutional 
muster under the fourth Central Hudson prong, as there is no vice 
exception to the First Amendment.121 Where there are direct regulations 
available to attain a state goal, a restriction on speech instead is 
impermissible.122 
This stricter interpretation of the Central Hudson test is a great 
departure from the more deferential standard promulgated by the 
Posadas Court. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas stated that the 
“stricter, more categorical interpretation of the fourth prong of Central 
Hudson. . .could, as a practical matter, go a long way toward [his] 
position.”123 Justice Thomas agreed with the outcome of the decision, 
that the government may not aim to keep consumers ignorant in order to 
decrease demand for legal products, but he did not necessarily think the 
 
115 Id. at 507. 
116 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 506. 
117 Id. at 507. 
118 Id. 
119
“[W]e are now persuaded that Posadas erroneously performed the First Amendment 
analysis.” Id. at 509. 
120 Id. at 511. 
121 Id. at 514; see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 n.2 (1995). 
122 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 524. 
123 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 
525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, v. United 
States 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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Central Hudson analysis was necessary in order to reach this result.124 
ii. Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States 
The Court had an opportunity to apply 44 Liquormart to a new set 
of facts in 1999 in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United 
States.125  The restriction at issue in that case was a federal statute 
preventing radio broadcasters from carrying advertisements for private 
casino gambling.126 The Fifth Circuit held that under Posadas, gambling 
was a vice activity that could be banned altogether by the legislature, 
therefore, the power to restrict speech was necessarily included within 
the broader power to ban.127 While a petition for certiorari was pending, 
the Court decided 44 Liquormart.128 Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
was reversed and the case was remanded so that the Central Hudson test 
would be applied more strictly, consistent with the recent 
developments.129 The Supreme Court later granted a new petition for 
certiorari after the Fifth Circuit held that the restrictions directly 
advanced a state interest and were no more extensive than necessary to 
serve that interest, thereby satisfying prongs three and four of Central 
Hudson.130 
The Supreme Court found that the restrictions satisfied prong one, 
as the speech was not misleading and it concerned private casino 
gambling, which was a lawful activity in the particular states.131 The 
asserted government interests in promulgating these restrictions were 
twofold: reducing the social costs associated with gambling and 
assisting states that prohibit gambling entirely.132 Although the Court 
ultimately held that these interests satisfied prong two because they 
could be considered to be substantial, it took a close look at the state’s 
motives and stated that that the characterization of these motives as 
substantial was “by no means self evident,” because the social costs of 
gambling are sometimes outweighed by other policy considerations.133 
 
124 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 525-26. 
125 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. 173. 
126 Id. at 176 (discussing 18 U.S.C § 1304 (1948)). 
127 Id. at 182. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 182-83. 
131 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 184. 
132 Id. at 185. 
133 Id. at 186. 
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Prior to this decision, it was rare for the Court to question the legitimacy 
of a government interest; the fact that the Court questioned the motive 
behind the state interest suggests a further step towards a much stricter 
application of the Central Hudson analysis. 
The Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n Court found that 
these restrictions failed prongs three and four because they did not 
directly advance the government interest, and because they were 
overbroad and inconsistent.134 The Court did not accept the assertion that 
the reduction of advertising would reduce overall demand for gambling 
because there were other types of non-private casinos (such as casinos 
on Indian reservations)135 that could still advertise.136 The ultimate effect 
of the regulation would “merely channel gamblers to one casino rather 
than another.”137 Additionally, the Court found that the statute failed 
prong four because it was “so pierced by exemptions and 
inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it.”138 
There can be no reasonable fit between a government interest and the 
means used to implement it where the statute is, at some points, 
inconsistent or unrelated to the asserted interest.139 This was an issue 
with this statute because it prohibited broadcasters from playing 
advertisements for private casinos, but advertisements by tribal casinos, 
non-profit casinos, government-operated gambling, and “occasional and 
ancillary” commercial casinos were exempt.140 Finally, the Court also 
found several alternatives to speech restrictions that would help the 
government achieve its goals, such as controls on casino admissions, 
betting limits, or licensing requirements.141 The overarching theme of the 
Court’s decision was that the Government had adopted an inconsistent 
policy that sacrificed too much legitimate commercial speech to be 
within constitutional bounds.142 
c. Recent Decisions: Continuing Trend Toward Strict Scrutiny 
A more recent decision explicitly held that speech regulation must 
 
134 Id. at 188-89. 
135 Id. at 187 n.5. 
136 Id. at 189. 
137 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 189. 
138 Id. at 190. 
139 Id. at 192-93. 
140 Id. at 190. 
141 Id. at 192. 
142 Id. at 194-95. 
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be a last resort in order to attain government objectives.143 In Thompson 
v. Western States Medical Center, the Supreme Court invalidated 
provisions of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act that 
restricted advertisements promoting compounded drugs.144 By 2002, the 
Central Hudson test was firmly established as the correct analytical 
framework for commercial speech cases as reflected by the fact that 
neither party challenged its application by requesting a more lenient or 
more stringent standard.145 Although the Court noted that several of its 
members had previously questioned the appropriateness of Central 
Hudson, there was no need to create a new framework where the current 
one provides an “adequate basis for decision;”146 it cited to both 
Lorillard and Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n as examples of 
recent decisions applying Central Hudson.147 
As with the prior cases, prongs one and two were satisfied in this 
case because the speech was not misleading, was related to lawful 
activity, and the government interest in public safety was substantial.148 
The government was concerned that if compound drug advertising were 
allowed, new drugs could enter the market without FDA approval.149 It 
argued that the restrictions met prong three (direct advancement of the 
public safety goal) because pharmacists would not be able to market 
compounded drugs on a large scale.150 The Court allowed the 
government’s explanation to suffice here, despite the fact that it relied 
on some unsupported assumptions about the requirement for large-scale 
advertising in order to successfully market a drug.151 This was not a step 
back toward the direction of Posadas, however. The Court only allowed 
the assumption because it found that, regardless of prong three, the 
 
143 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002). 
144 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. § 353(a) (1998); id. 
Drug compounding is a process that is taught in pharmacy schools whereby a doctor or 
pharmacist combines or alters medications in order to tailor them to specific patient needs. 
See Thompson, 535 U.S. at 360-61. 
145 Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367. 
146 Id. at 368. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 368-69. 
149 Id. at 371. 
150 Id.  
151
“Assuming it is true that drugs cannot be marketed on a large scale without 
advertising, the FDAMA’s prohibition on advertising compounded drugs might indeed 
‘directly advance[e]’ the Government’s interests.” Thompson, 535 U.S. at 371 (citing Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
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restrictions were invalid because they failed prong four: “. . .the 
Government has failed to demonstrate that the speech restrictions are 
‘not more extensive than is necessary to serve [those] interest[s].’”152 
In order to satisfy prong four, the government must prove that 
there was no other way to achieve its interests other than by restricting 
speech.153 Here, there was no evidence that the government ever 
considered any alternatives other than the restriction on advertising.154 
After the Court listed several non-speech related regulations that would 
directly accomplish the government’s goal, such as compounding only 
in response to a prescription, it invalidated the statute.155 This decision 
firmly rejected the idea that “government has an interest in preventing 
the dissemination of truthful commercial information in order to prevent 
members of the public from making bad decisions with the 
information.”156 Therefore, going forward, a fear that the public will 
make bad choices is not a sufficient justification for preventing the 
dissemination of truthful information. 
d. Future Predictions for Central Hudson Analysis 
Despite the fact that the Central Hudson test has been criticized in 
the past, it is likely that courts will apply a strict version of Central 
Hudson to commercial speech cases in the future, as no alternative legal 
analytical framework has been as extensively developed. This is the 
appropriate test because it sets a middle ground for commercial speech. 
On one hand, the government has an interest in ensuring that people are 
not misled as they enter into commercial transactions. However, the 
government may not have paternalistic motives in its regulation of 
commercial speech. The First Amendment guarantees that adult citizens 
have the right to personally evaluate truthful information about lawful 
products.157 The Central Hudson test allows courts to balance the 
interests of the government against the interests of the public. 
Although Justice Thomas proposed several times that Central 
 
152 Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 373. 
155 Id. at 377. 
156 Id. at 374. 
157 E.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001) (“so long as the sale 
and use of tobacco is lawful for adults, the tobacco industry has a protected interest in 
communicating information about its products and adult customers have an interest in 
receiving that information.”). 
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Hudson has no role where the government is aiming to suppress 
information about a lawful product, and instead such restrictions should 
be per se invalid ,158 the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly thrown out 
the Central Hudson test in favor of such a theory. Instead, a court will 
closely scrutinize the regulation and a strict interpretation of Central 
Hudson in line with Thompson will be used to evaluate the First 
Amendment challenge to the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act. If the Act’s regulations are found to be paternalistic, 
ineffective, or overbroad, then they will fail the Central Hudson test and 
should therefore be held unconstitutional. 
IV. BIG TOBACCO’S CURRENT CHALLENGE TO THE FAMILY 
SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT 
On August 31, 2009, two of the three largest American tobacco 
companies filed suit against the government in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Kentucky.159 Plaintiffs in this challenge 
included R.J. Reynolds, the second largest tobacco seller in the country 
and the maker of Camel cigarettes,160 and Lorillard, the third largest 
tobacco seller and the maker of Newport cigarettes.161 Noticeably absent 
from the lawsuit was Philip Morris, the largest tobacco company in the 
United States and the maker of Marlboro cigarettes.162 Upon first glance, 
it is surprising that the largest tobacco company did not challenge the 
highly restrictive laws; however, upon closer inspection of the Act, the 
reasoning becomes clear: the FDA is unlikely to approve any new 
tobacco products, thus locking in the market share and eliminating 
competition for the current number one company.163 This also explains 
why R.J. Reynolds and Lorillard are fighting so hard to prevent the 
advertising restrictions from being put into effect. If new products will 
not be approved, it is even more important for these companies to be 
 
158 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 
(1999) (Thomas, J., concurring); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
159 Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d. 512 (W.D. Ky. 
2010); Big Tobacco Strikes Back, supra note 6. 
160 Duff Wilson, A Vote Nears for a Tobacco Bill That Philip Morris Can Live With, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C00E4DD 
123CF932A35757C0A96F9C8B63.  
161 The Associated Press, 2 Tobacco Giants File Suit to Block Marketing Rules, NORTH 
JERSEY.COM (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.northjersey.com/news/56479952.html. 
162 Wilson, supra note 160. 
163 Id. 
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able to contact existing adult smokers to convince them to switch 
brands. Thus, the relief requested in the Complaint was a declaratory 
judgment that the soon-to-be-implemented regulations are 
unconstitutional.164 Additionally, the plaintiffs sought preliminary and 
permanent injunctions preventing the FDA from enforcing the allegedly 
unconstitutional provisions of the Act.165 
The plaintiffs did not challenge the Act in its entirety. Rather, the 
Complaint pointed to ten specific provisions of the Act that the 
plaintiffs found objectionable and unconstitutional because they 
eliminate the few arenas tobacco companies have left to communicate 
with adult consumers.166 On January 4, 2010, the Western District of 
Kentucky found that two of the challenged provisions of the Act violate 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.167 Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. 
ruled that the FDA could not enforce the ban against color and graphics 
or the restriction against making statements that suggest tobacco 
products are less harmful due to compliance with FDA regulations.168 
a. Ban on Color and Graphics 
The Act’s ban on the use of color and graphics directed the FDA to 
re-issue the 1996 regulation that limited advertisements to black text on 
a white background (or vice versa).169 This was supported by a 
Congressional finding that “text only requirements. . .will help reduce 
underage use of tobacco products,” and the government had argued in 
the past that the industry had “exploited adolescents’ vulnerability to 
imagery.”170 The court accepted plaintiffs’ argument that images of their 
 
164 Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 6, at 8.  
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 12. The tobacco companies specifically challenge the Act’s: (1) ban on using 
color or images in advertising; (2) mandated warnings on tobacco packages; (3) ban on 
truthful statements regarding modified risk tobacco products; (4) ban on outdoor 
advertising; (5) ban on brand name sponsorship of events; (6) ban on brand name 
merchandise; (7) ban on references to the FDA; (8) ban on product samples; (9) ban on joint 
product marketing; and (10) ban on promotions offering gifts in consideration of the 
purchase of tobacco products. Id. at 13-29. 
167 Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525-26, 535 
(W.D. Ky. 2010). 
168 See id.; Michael Felberbaum, Judge OKs Color, Graphics in Ads, HERALD SUN 
(Durham), Jan. 5, 2010, http://www.heraldsun.com/view/full_story/5445168/article-Judge-
OKs-color--graphics-in-ads. 
169 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201, 
123 Stat. 1776, 1843 (2009). 
170 Id. § 2; United States v. Philip Morris U.S.A, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 571 (D.D.C. 
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brand symbols and use of color communicate important information 
about their product to adults.171 Interestingly, the court did not make any 
specific mention of the Central Hudson prongs, yet it is evident from 
the opinion that this regulation failed prongs three and four. Banning the 
use of all symbols and colors would not directly advance the 
government interest in preventing children from smoking because there 
was no evidence to support the fact that all images and colors encourage 
children to smoke.172 Judge McKinley stated that “there is no suggestion 
in any of the literature cited by the government that symbols such as 
National’s Beech-Nut chewing tobacco insignia. . .[or] the color of 
Lorillard’s Newport menthol cigarette packaging. . .are a part of what 
Congress found to be problematic associative advertising techniques 
aimed at minors.”173 Thus, the government did not meet its burden of 
showing that the ban on color and graphics would materially advance its 
interest in preventing children from smoking. 
The ban on color and graphics also failed prong four of the Central 
Hudson test. Here, the judge quoted from Central Hudson: “[t]he 
regulatory technique may extend only as far as the interest it serves. The 
State cannot regulate speech that poses no danger to the asserted state 
interest. . .nor can it completely suppress information when narrower 
restrictions on expression would serve its interest as well.”174 The court 
ruled that even if there was a direct connection between some graphics 
and color and youth smoking, the ban was a “blanket ban” and was 
overbroad.175 Less restrictive alternatives exist to prevent advertisements 
targeting children, such as only banning colors and images that have a 
special appeal to children.176 Therefore, the District Court found the 
black and white text only advertising requirement to be 
unconstitutional.177 
b. Ban on Statements Regarding FDA Approval 
The District Court also struck down the provision of the Act that 
 
2006). 
171 Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 525. 
172 Id.  
173 Id. 
174 Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 565 (1980)). 
175 Id. at 525-26. 
176 Id.  
177 Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
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bans any mention of the FDA regulation of tobacco.178 The ban was on 
any statement made by anyone, express or implied, directed to 
consumers, that products were safer because the FDA regulated them.179 
The court did not need to evaluate this regulation through the Central 
Hudson lens because it found that the ban regulated more than just 
commercial speech.180 Plaintiffs successfully argued that “almost any 
public comment on these ‘product standards’. . .could be construed as 
an ‘implied’ statement that they made Plaintiffs’ products ‘less 
harmful.’”181 The court agreed that journalists, doctors, scientists, and 
politicians have an interest in commenting on the FDA regulations and 
that it is “without question that the ban applies to more than just 
commercial speech and must satisfy strict scrutiny.”182 The problematic 
issue for Judge McKinley was that Congress did not limit this provision 
to speech by tobacco companies. Therefore, federal law prohibited other 
professionals from publicly commenting on the FDA regulations. 
Because the government did not even attempt to put forth enough 
evidence to satisfy strict scrutiny, the regulation was ruled 
unconstitutional.183 
Although Judge McKinley overturned two provisions of the Act, 
he upheld the other eight challenged provisions.184 On March 5, 2010, 
the tobacco companies filed an appeal from the order upholding the 
challenged provisions,185 and three days later, the government filed an 
appeal from the order preventing the FDA from enforcing the two 
overturned provisions.186 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit will have the 
opportunity to evaluate all ten challenges to determine whether the Act 
violates the First Amendment rights of the tobacco companies. 
V. UNDER CENTRAL HUDSON, SEVERAL ACT PROVISIONS 
 
178 Id. at 535. 
179 21 U.S.C. § 331(tt), amended by Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 103, 123 Stat. 1776, 1834 (2009). 
180 Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 535. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 See generally Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 
(W.D. Ky. 2010). 
185 Plaintiffs’ Joint Notice of Appeal, Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 
F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-117-M). 
186 Defendants’ Notice of Appeal, Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. 
Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-117-M). 
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SHOULD BE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
 
 Based on the analysis discussed in Part IV, the District Court 
came to the correct conclusions regarding the ban on color and graphics 
and the ban on statements regarding FDA approval. The ban on color 
and graphics fails the Central Hudson test because there is no clear 
connection between all color and images in advertising and youth 
smoking, and because it is overbroad in scope. Similarly, the injunction 
against enforcing the ban on statements regarding FDA approval was 
properly granted, since it fails the fourth prong of Central Hudson. 
Although the court did not evaluate this regulation under the 
commercial speech lens, it is apparent that even if it had, it would have 
failed. While the government’s goal of preventing false claims of “FDA 
approval” in advertisements would be met, the regulation was not 
narrowly tailored. It was more extensive than necessary to accomplish 
government goals, as it targeted any statement, made by anyone, 
express or implied, if it was directed at consumers.187 
The regulations published by the FDA on March 19, 2010 address 
the ban on color and graphics, but ignore the ban on statements 
regarding FDA approval.188 Due to the pending litigation, the FDA has 
stated that it will not exercise its enforcement discretion against 
companies who continue to use color and graphics until the issue has 
been resolved in court.189 The fact that no regulations were issued 
regarding compliance with the ban on statements concerning FDA 
approval suggests that the FDA is not pursuing enforcement of this 
provision at this time. Interestingly, the Draft Guidance for Industry 
published by the FDA’s Center for Tobacco Products states that the 
regulations only apply to manufacturers, retailers, and distributers.190 
Thus, even when the regulations are limited to regulating tobacco 
companies, and therefore potentially come close to compliance with the 
First Amendment, the FDA may choose to proceed with caution in that 
 
187 21 U.S.C. §331(tt), amended by Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 301, 123 Stat. 1776, 1834 (2009). 
188 21 C.F.R. § 1140.32 (2010). 
189 CTR. FOR TOBACCO PRODS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATIONS RESTRICTING THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF CIGARETTES 
AND SMOKELESS TOBACCO TO PROTECT CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 3 (June 2010), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceCompliance 
RegulatoryInformation/UCM214424.pdf. 
190 Id. at 4-5. 
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area. 
The remainder of this Note will suggest that four specific 
provisions that were not overturned by the District Court should have 
been struck down: the ban on outdoor advertising, the ban on brand 
name sponsorship, and the bans on product samples and gifts. The 
regulations on product samples and gifts are so similar that they are 
discussed together. All four of these regulations clearly fail the Central 
Hudson analysis as it has been applied over the past decade. 
a. Ban on Outdoor Advertising 
The ban on outdoor advertising within 1000 feet of a public school 
or playground should be struck down by the Sixth Circuit, as the exact 
same provisions have already been held to be invalid in Lorillard.191 In 
fact, Judge McKinley stated that the ban is “indistinguishable from the 
Massachusetts’ ban the Supreme Court struck down in 
LorillardFalse”192 However, because Congress instructed the FDA to 
issue regulations to go into effect on June 22, 2010,193 Judge McKinley 
concluded that plaintiffs’ challenge to the ban was not yet ripe in this 
instance as it was only January.194 Interestingly, the FDA issued 
regulations on March 19, 2010 that reserved its decision on 
implementing the 1000-foot rule for a future time.195 The agency is 
requesting comments and data that may have been developed since 
1996 that will assist them in determining whether the 1000-foot rule 
complies with Lorillard.196 
In Lorillard, the Supreme Court held that the restriction failed 
prong four because the regulation was more extensive than necessary to 
serve the asserted interest.197 Justice O’Connor stated that this regulation 
 
191 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 562 (2001). 
192 Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 535 (W.D. Ky. 
2010). 
193 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 102, 
123 Stat. 1776, 1831 (2009). 
194 Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 535-36. Judge McKinley quoted 
Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320 (1991), which stated that plaintiffs alleging a First 
Amendment violation must “demonstrate a live dispute involving the actual or threatened 
application of [a statute or policy] to bar particular speech.” Id.  
195 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless 
Tobacco To Protect Children and Adolescents, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,225, 13,226 (Mar. 19, 2010) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1140). 
196 Id. 
197 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 565 (2001); see also supra Part II. 
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was overbroad and demonstrated a lack of tailoring as it would “have 
widely disparate effects nationwide.”198 The Kentucky District Court 
agreed that a ban on outdoor advertising within 1000 feet of a school or 
playground was unconstitutional,199 yet because the FDA had not yet 
issued the regulations, the plaintiffs had no immediate injury.200 
The research and information that the FDA receives will heavily 
influence the outcome of this challenge. It does not appear likely that it 
will pass constitutional muster, unless the rule is more closely tailored 
to locations where children are present. In order to fit within the modern 
strict interpretation of Central Hudson’s fourth prong, the regulation 
may not be more extensive than necessary; in other words, the 
government must prove that there was no other way to achieve its 
interest.201 Simply banning tobacco advertisements on school grounds or 
at public playgrounds appears to be the best way to achieve this goal 
without impeding on the rights of the tobacco companies. A 1000-foot 
radius rule covers far too much territory to remain within constitutional 
boundaries, especially in urban areas. 
b. Ban on Brand Name Sponsorship 
Another provision that should be held unconstitutional is the ban 
on brand name sponsorship. This regulation has no exceptions and 
applies to all events, even a vague category of “social or cultural 
events.”202 The Kentucky District Court concluded that there was a 
reasonable fit between the means and the ends of the sponsorship ban.203 
The FDA has promulgated regulations prohibiting tobacco companies 
from using their brand names to sponsor any athletic event, musical 
event, artistic event, social or cultural event, or any type of entry in any 
event.204 A higher court should find that this is unconstitutional, and 
 
198 Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 563. 
199 Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 535-36. 
200 Id. at 536. 
201 See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371-72 (2002). 
202 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless 
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,527 (Aug. 28, 1996), 
reissued by Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 
102, 123 Stat. 1776, 1830 (2009) (stating that the FDA is directed to re-issue the regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in 1996); see Commonwealth 
Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
203 Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 527. 
204 21 C.F.R. § 1140.34 (2010). 
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therefore unenforceable, due to the overwhelming evidence that the ban 
is a sweeping, overbroad regulation on the tobacco companies’ right to 
communicate with adult consumers. 
Even if the FDA is able to satisfy prong three of Central Hudson 
by demonstrating that brand name sponsorship of events where children 
are present has a direct correlation to children smoking, it will be unable 
to show that there is a connection between sponsorship of adult-only 
events and youth smoking. If sponsorships of adult-only events never 
reach children, the FDA will not be able to present substantive proof 
that these events have any effect on children. Next, prong four of the 
Central Hudson test requires a close fit between the end goal and the 
means used to achieve it.205 There is a clear lack of tailoring with this 
blanket ban on all sponsorship of any type of event, as it prohibits 
speech that will never reach children.206 For example, the Newport 
cigarette brand sponsors a private, invitation-only blackjack tournament 
in Las Vegas each year.207 The tournament has no impact on minors, as 
minors are not even permitted to enter the casino where the tournament 
is held, yet that sponsorship would be banned under the Act.208 Lorillard 
suggested that a uniform and broad prohibition on communication 
would be invalid unless the government can demonstrate the necessity 
of the ban as it relates to their interest.209 Although the FDA has an 
interest in protecting children, this does not justify an “unnecessarily 
broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.”210 An appellate court 
should find that the ban on sponsorship violates the First Amendment 
rights of the plaintiffs. 
c. Bans on Product Samples and Gifts 
The FDA blanket bans on product samples and gift promotions 
should both reach a similar fate, as the restrictions are not narrowly 
tailored to further the government goal of protecting minors. The 
 
205 E.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999). 
206 Others have criticized this provision of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act for the same reason stated herein. See Elaine Stoll, Student Article, The Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act and the First Amendment: Why a Substantial 
Interest in Protecting Public Health Won’t Save Some New Restrictions on Tobacco 
Advertising, 65 Food & Drug L.J. 873, 897 (2010). 
207 Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 6, at 25. 
208 Id. 
209 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 563 (2001). 
210 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997). 
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District Court did not find a commercial speech interest implicated here 
because the distribution of product samples and the rewarding of 
tobacco purchasers is conduct that can be directly regulated without 
involving the First Amendment.211 This is incorrect, however, because 
advertising extends beyond print ads and billboards. Advertising can 
also include enticing lawful prospective consumers by letting them try 
products before purchase, as well as rewarding loyal consumers by 
awarding prizes for purchase. Tobacco companies have the right to 
communicate information about their products through these alternative 
methods and the Central Hudson framework should apply. 
It is possible that these restrictions could pass the third prong of 
Central Hudson because they are arguably effective at keeping tobacco 
products and merchandise out of the hands of children; if products are 
not given away, there is no chance that a child could come into contact 
with them. These bans fail the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, 
however, because they are overbroad and restrict too much 
communication with legal users. Both product samples and gift 
promotions are currently strictly limited to adult smokers and 
extraordinary measures are taken to ensure that minors are excluded.212 
However, the FDA promulgated bans on both of these practices in a 
purported attempt to protect children from being targeted by tobacco 
advertisements. The ban against promotions giving gifts in 
consideration of tobacco purchases has no exceptions and is thus not 
tailored at all to serve any governmental goal.213 The ban on product 
 
211 Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 538-39 (W.D. 
Ky. 2010). 
212 For example, Lorillard’s “Newport Pleasure Goods” program allows adult smokers 
to collect UPC labels from cigarettes and send them to the company in exchange for prizes. 
All participants must be able to affirmatively demonstrate that they are at least twenty-one 
years of age in order to participate. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 6, at 29. The website 
for Newport Pleasure Goods requires smokers to become members. NEWPORT PLEASURE 
GOODS, http://www.newport-pleasure.com/index.aspx (last visited May 5, 2011). In order to 
become a member, a smoker must first enter his or her birthday, and then fill out a 
registration form that includes the last four digits of a social security number, as well as a 
driver license number so that the company can verify that all members are over age twenty-
one. Id. (follow “Click Here To Sign Up” link). This is in stark contrast to websites that sell 
alcohol. For example, a customer can buy beer from the Saranac Brewery and have it 
shipped to them, so long as state law permits shipment of beer. My Saranac, MOTT 
BREWING COMPANY, http://mysaranac.com/index.html (last visited May 5, 2011). The only 
age verification in this process is the requirement that the person who signs for the package 
must be twenty-one years old. Frequently Asked Questions & Answers, MOTT BREWING 
COMPANY, http://mysaranac.com/SiteFAQs.asp (last visited May 5, 2011). 
213 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless 
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samples does contain an exception for smokeless tobacco: product 
samples of smokeless tobacco can be distributed, but only in facilities 
that do not serve alcohol.214 This is inconsistent with the government’s 
purported goal of preventing youth smoking because it allows the 
distribution of product samples of smokeless tobacco, but interestingly 
only in areas where children are permitted, such as restaurants, and not 
in facilities that serve alcohol and only allow adults to enter, such as 
bars and nightclubs. As stated in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting 
Ass’n, a regulation that is so “pierced by exemptions and 
inconsistencies” cannot be upheld.215 The Sixth Circuit should therefore 
invalidate these unlawful provisions. 
VI. SOLUTION: REDUCING THE SCOPE OF THE ACT. 
The stated goal of the Act is to reduce the use of tobacco products 
by children under the age of eighteen.216 Congressional findings state 
that “such regulations are narrowly tailored to restrict those advertising 
and promotional practices which are most likely to be seen or heard by 
youth and most likely to entice them into tobacco use, while affording 
tobacco manufacturers and sellers ample opportunity to convey 
information about their products to adult consumers.”217 However, many 
of the regulations are over-broad and restrict more speech than 
necessary in order to reduce children’s access to and demand for 
tobacco. A better solution is for the government to regulate tobacco 
products directly, instead of attempting to prevent advertising and 
marketing of legal products.  Regulating speech must always be a last 
resort, not a first resort.218 Alternative ways to achieve the goal of 
reducing youth smoking include criminalizing the underage possession 
of tobacco products, imposing greater penalties on those retailers who 
allow minors to purchase tobacco products, and creating educational 
programs to teach children about the dangers of tobacco use. 
Next, any regulations imposed on the advertising or marketing of 
tobacco products should be strictly limited to those instances in which 
 
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,527, reissued by 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 102, 123 Stat. 
1776, 1830-31 (2009).  
214 § 102, 123 Stat. at 1831; 21 C.F.R. § 1140.16(d) (2010). 
215 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 190 (1999). 
216 § 2, 123 Stat. at 1779. 
217 Id. 
218 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002). 
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children are affected.  Restrictions that prohibit advertising in bars, 
nightclubs, and casinos are not narrowly tailored because these places 
require proof of age in order to enter. Any advertising that takes place in 
adult-only facilities cannot be restricted in order to achieve the goal of 
reducing tobacco use by minors. In addition, direct marketing 
campaigns, such as the promotional gift programs that strictly verify 
participants’ age, should be beyond the scope of the statute because they 
also do not reach children. 
CONCLUSION 
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act states 
that its goal is to reduce youth smoking, yet the Act actually attempts to 
target all smokers. Although Congress made it clear that the use of 
tobacco products was not completely banned, it then proceeded to cut 
off almost every way that tobacco manufacturers can communicate with 
adult smokers. 
This Act sets a dangerous precedent for other “vice” products 
because it aims to prevent adults from making an educated decision as 
to what they want to be exposed. As the Supreme Court held that 
paternalistic goals are impermissible motives for restrictions on 
speech,219 and that there is no “vice” exception to the First 
Amendment,220 the government may not create speech barriers between 
tobacco companies and adult consumers. There must be a balance 
between the governmental interest in protecting children from health 
risks associated with tobacco use and the tobacco company’s interest in 
running a business selling a legal product. The government must either 
completely outlaw tobacco, or remove the restrictions on advertising so 
that adults can weigh the risks of tobacco use for themselves. What the 
government may not do is allow a company to manufacture a legal 
product and then sabotage their efforts to run a business by violating 
their First Amendment rights. 
 
 
219 Id. at 375. 
220 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 514 (1996). 
